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Abstract
As a crucial security problem, anti-spoofing in biomet-
rics, and particularly for the face modality, has achieved
great progress in the recent years. Still, new threats ar-
rive in form of better, more realistic and more sophisticated
spoofing attacks. The objective of the 2nd Competition on
Counter Measures to 2D Face Spoofing Attacks is to chal-
lenge researchers to create counter measures effectively de-
tecting a variety of attacks. The submitted propositions are
evaluated on the Replay-Attack database and the achieved
results are presented in this paper.
1. Introduction
As a result of the great advancement of biometrics in
the past years, systems secured by the paradigm to present
“who you are” instead of “what you possess” or “what you
remember” [12] have reached great popularity. Biometric
systems have become robust, efficient and accurate even in
challenging conditions. A recent problem that is question-
ing the application of biometrics when high security is re-
quired are spoofing attacks. Also referred to as presentation
attacks, spoofing attacks are performed when an invalid user
tries to gain access to the system by presenting a copy of the
biometric traits of a valid user.
Many widely used biometric modalities can be a subject
to spoofing. In the domain of face modality, an attacker has
a variety of options: from a simple print of the valid user’s
face to video replays or even more complex 3D masks. Ob-
taining face images of a valid user is nowadays nearly a
trivial task: they are present in abundance on the Internet or
can be easily taken cooperatively or at distance.
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Until recently, face anti-spoofing researchers were con-
fronted with the lack of publicly available databases con-
taining different types of attacks. Many of the state-of-
the-art algorithms have been evaluated on databases which
are not publicly released. The pioneer publicly available
face spoofing database is NUAA [20], followed by Print-
Attack [3], both containing only printed attacks. CASIA-
FASD [26] is the first database containing three types of
attacks: printed photographs, printed photographs with per-
forated eyes regions and video replay attacks. An important
limitation of some of these databases is the absence of a
precise protocol containing training, development and test
sets. The consequence is a difficulty in fair evaluation and
comparison of face anti-spoofing methods.
The first attempt to benchmark face anti-spoofing algo-
rithms was the Competition on Counter Measures to 2D
Facial Spoofing Attacks [4], where the participants’ algo-
rithms were evaluated on the Print-Attack database. The
possibility for fair evaluation on this database is provided
by its protocol, which precisely defines training, develop-
ment and test sets. In the meantime, an amendment of
this database with 2 additional types of attacks (photo at-
tacks and video replay attacks) has led to the creation of
Replay-Attack database [5], which inherits its unbiased pro-
tocol. This has motivated the 2nd Competition on Counter
Measures to 2D Face Spoofing Attacks: an effort to probe
the current trends in face anti-spoofing and to compare and
evaluate novel face anti-spoofing algorithms on a variety of
spoofing attacks.
The existing state-of-the-art face spoofing counter-
measures can be categorized in three broad categories [4].
The texture-based methods explore the texture artifacts and
the quality deterioration that appear when an image is re-
captured. The motion-based methods explore the unnatu-
ral movements on the scene in the case of spoofing attacks,
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Table 1. Participating teams’ names and institutions
Team Institution
CASIA Center for Biometrics and Security Re-
search & National Laboratory of Pattern
Recognition, Institute of Automation, Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences
IGD Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics
Research IGD
MaskDown joint team from Idiap Research Institute,
University of Oulu and University of Camp-
inas
LNMIIT The LNM Institute Of Information Technol-
ogy, Jaipur
MUVIS Tampere University of Technology
PRA Lab University of Cagliari
ATVS Universidad Autonoma de Madrid
Unicamp joint team from University of Campinas and
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
while the liveness-based methods try to detect any evidence
of liveness on the scene as an indicator of the presence of a
real person.
Unique spoofing counter-measures, some of which go
beyond the boundaries of the mentioned categories, have
been proposed by 8 teams participating in this competition.
In this paper they are thoroughly explained and their spoof-
ing detection capabilities are compared using the Replay-
Attack database. The teams’ details are provided in Table 1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: a
short description of Replay-Attack database follows in Sec-
tion 2. Each team’s face spoofing counter-measure is de-
scribed in Section 3, followed by a report on its performance
and a comparative analysis in Section 4. Conclusions are
given in Section 5.
2. Replay-Attack database
The Replay-Attack face spoofing database1 [5] consists
of short video recordings of both real-access and attack at-
tempts to 50 different identities. The database contains
three types of attacks: printed photographs, photographs
displayed on the screen of a device and videos replayed on
the screen of a device. The attacks are divided into two
groups with regards to the support the attack media is at-
tached to when they are presented to the system: fixed (the
attack media is attached on a fixed stall) and hand (the at-
tacker holds the attack media with her hands). Furthermore,
the photo and video replay attacks can be of lower quality
(taken with an iPhone and displayed on an iPhone screen)
and of high quality (displayed on an iPad screen). These
variations introduce even larger diversity in the spoofing at-
tacks present in the database.
1http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
Besides the different attack types, this database has
several other advantages over the previous face spoofing
databases. Firstly, it defines a precise protocol consisting
of training, development and test sets. For fair and unbi-
ased algorithm evaluation, it is recommended that the train-
ing set is used to train counter-measures, development set to
estimate specific parameters to maximize the performance,
while the test set should be solely used to report results.
Secondly, the database provides a separate set of enrollment
videos, which can be used to train and evaluate a face recog-
nition system. Such an approach is of high importance, as
it enables to assess how effective the attacks are in deceiv-
ing a face recognition system and whether an anti-spoofing
scheme is necessary in that setup. As claimed by [5], more
than 80% of the attacks in this database successfully bypass
a baseline face verification system.
The total number of videos in the database is 1200 (360
in the training set, 360 in the development set and 480 in the
test set). In the course of the competition, the participants
had access to all the protocol sets of the data. However,
in the test stage, they received an anonymized test set that
consists of clipped versions of the original test set videos,
containing 100 frames with a random starting frame.
3. Summaries of the anti-spoofing algorithms
CASIA The team takes advantage of the differences be-
tween the real accesses and spoofing attacks from two as-
pects: motion and texture. In terms of motion, the algo-
rithm is motivated by the observation that the spoofing at-
tacks have either global motion or no motion, whereas the
real accesses have motion localized at the human body re-
gions. The team proposes feature-level fusion of motion
and texture characteristics.
For the motion features, the team implemented Gunnar
Farneback’s algorithm [8] to extract dense optical flows be-
tween two frames, with an interval of five frames. To char-
acterize the global and local distribution of motion, each
frame is divided into three regions: head, torso and back-
ground. The regions are further divided into 6, 3 and 2 sub-
regions, respectively. For each of the obtained 11 regions,
2 temporal sequences are computed: one for the angles and
one for the magnitudes of the optical flow. Three types of
features are extracted from these temporal sequences: fre-
quency coefficients computed using 1D Fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT), histogram of magnitudes of optical flows and
correlation coefficients for each pair of two magnitude and
two angle sequences of a video. For the texture features,
the team exploits multi-scale Local Binary Patterns (LBP)
as in [14] to analyze the quality degradation of the attack
samples. The features are extracted only from the head re-
gion of one random frame of the video.
The extracted motion and texture features are concate-
nated into the final feature vector. Then, the features are fed
into a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM).
IGD The implemented approach exploits subtle changes
in the faces of the subjects in the videos that are characteris-
tic for real accesses. In particular, the team implemented an
algorithm which magnifies the small changes of color and
movement which appear on the face due to the blood flow.
After magnifying, these changes are expected to have dif-
ferent nature in the real access videos compared to spoofing
attacks.
In order to magnify the changes happening with a set
of given frequencies, Eulerian magnification [23] is applied
on the video sequences as a preprocessing step. The se-
lected frequencies represent the frequency range of human
pulse. The algorithm uses two main approaches for spatial
decomposition: Laplacian and Gaussian pyramids. Both
approaches are implemented to magnify changes of differ-
ent nature.
From the Gaussian filter output, among 30 frames, the
frame whose output has the largest average magnitude was
picked to represent the video. The Laplacian filter outputs
of the frames in the video are averaged over 30 frames. The
obtained results are processed with PCA for dimensionality
reduction. The two final feature vectors are fed into sepa-
rate AdaBoost [9] classifiers. The obtained scores for the
two approaches are then normalized and combined using a
weighted sum fusion rule.
MaskDown The team creates a composite system by
joining different categories of counter-measures together,
each of which may be effective against a single type of at-
tack. After fusing the systems at score-level, the final sys-
tem should be effective against all types of attacks.
For describing static texture, the team extracts two types
of features: uniform Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [16]
and texture features from Gray-Level Co-occurrence Ma-
trix (GLCM) [11]. The both types of features are classi-
fied using Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). In addition,
the different texture patterns in spatio-temporal domain are
explored using Local Binary Patterns from Three Orthog-
onal Planes (LBP-TOP) [25] operator. More specifically,
the team analyzes dynamic texture content within two dif-
ferent time windows by combining the temporal process-
ing strategies proposed in [6] and [13]. The motion based
counter measure exploits the high correlation between the
movements in the background and in the face region in the
case of spoofing attacks [3].
The texture features are computed for each frame sepa-
rately on normalized face bounding box. The scores of the
three visual cues for each time window are fused using Lin-
ear Logistic Regression (LLR). The scores for the videos
are obtained by averaging the scores over all time windows.
The proposed algorithm is easily reproducible be-
cause the source code, programmed using the free signal-
processing and machine-learning toolbox Bob2 [2], is
freely available3.
LNMIIT The method proposed by this team performs
both texture and motion analysis on a video and combines
the information on feature level. The algorithm utilizes
three types of intuitive visual features. Firstly, to capture
textural information, the team uses LBP features calculated
on the face region, similarly to [14]. Secondly, as a com-
plementary non-rigid motion analysis approach, the team
extracts face background consistency features [24]. Gaus-
sian Mixture Model (GMM) [19] is used for background
modeling. The third type of features combines motion and
texture analysis and consists of 2D FFT on the GMM mod-
eled background.
Each of the three feature types aims at detecting differ-
ent types of attacks. The first type of features is effective
against printed and low-quality attacks. The second type
aims at detecting video replay attacks, while the third one is
able to cope with high-definition video attacks.
All the three types of feature vectors are computed on
per-frame basis and averaged over the full video. The three
features vectors are concatenated in a single feature vector.
The classifier used for discrimination between real accesses
and spoofing attacks is Hidden Markov Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVMhmm) [1].
MUVIS The team adopts a texture-based approach by
extracting two types of texture features: LBP and Gabor.
Unlike many previously proposed solutions which are com-
puting the texture features only on the face region of the
frame [6], [5], this approach takes whole scene into account
because the authors believe that the surrounding region of
face also contains dominant cues for detection of spoofing
attacks.
For the LBP features, a Rotation-Invariant Uniform LBP
(LBP riu2P,R ) histogram [16] is computed individually for ev-
ery frame of the video, where the number of neighboring
pixels P = 16 and the radius R = 2. The Gabor features
require computation of Gabor wavelet transform in 4 scales
and 6 orientations. The feature vector on per-frame basis is
constructed using mean and standard deviation of the mag-
nitude of the transform coefficients [15].
In both cases, the feature vector on video-level is com-
puted as average of the feature vectors on frame-level. The
result of the concatenation of the two feature vectors is fed
into Partial Least Square regression [7] classifier.
2http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob
3Code available at: https://pypi.python.org/pypi/
antispoofing.competition_icb2013
PRA Lab The team’s choice is to use only static image
analysis to detect spoofing attacks. The aim of static anal-
ysis is to discover some peculiarities related to the visual
structure of the input samples.
To detect the differences in the visual information be-
tween data captured from a real scene and from an attack,
the team explored several different types of visual features
(e.g. color features, edges, textures etc.) . For detailed ref-
erence of the used features, please refer to the team’s algo-
rithm in [4].The features are extracted from each frame and
they are used to train several SVMs (for each feature sep-
arately). Based on the training results, a subset of features
is selected by taking into account both the performance and
the classification time.
The final spoofing score of a video is obtained by us-
ing a two stage combination of the scores. The first stage
of combination is performed at frame level: the scores ob-
tained for different features are fused to create a single con-
fidence score for a given frame. The second stage combines
the scores for the frames to calculate the final score for the
video. This is done in an incremental way in order to sim-
ulate a “live” tool: the final score is recalculated with every
new frame in the video as the time passes.
For the both stages the team used Dynamic Score Com-
bination [22] as a score-level fusion rule that allows dynam-
ically choosing the best scores and weights to be combined.
It requires computation of a weight parameter via majority
voting [21]. In the second combination stage the team in-
troduced a heuristic to exclude single frames with outlier
scores.
ATVS The method proposed by this team is based on
the expectation that a recaptured image has different quality
than a real sample acquired in the normal operation sce-
nario for which the sensor was designed. Motivated by this
different quality hypothesis, the system uses a novel param-
eterization of 25 objective Image Quality Measures (IQM)
which provide a quantitative score that describes the level
of distortion of the input image. Two types of IQMs are
present in the feature set: full-reference and no-reference.
To compute full-reference IQM, an original distortion-free
reference image is needed [18]. Since in the case of spoof-
ing attack detection there is no access to such a sample, the
team simulates it by filtering the input image with a low-
pass Gaussian kernel (σ = 0.5 and size 3× 3). To compute
no-reference IQM (also referred as blind), a pre-trained sta-
tistical model is required [17].
Among 25 IQM in the feature vector, 21 are full-
reference and 4 are no-reference. They are classified using
LDA classifier. The system works on a frame-by-frame ba-
sis. The final score for a video is produced as an average of
the scores of its frames.
Unicamp The team explores artifacts which appear in re-
captured videos, such as distortion, moiring and band effect.
For that, the team designed a feature characterization pro-
cess to extract a noise signature of biometric samples. The
algorithm takes advantage of global information over time
and is invariant to the video content.
The algorithm consists of 4 steps. The first step isolates
the noise signature information contained in the video. This
process consists of subtracting the frames of the original
video from a filtered version of the frames (with Gaussian
filter with size 3 × 3, µ = 0, and σ = 0.5) and results
in a new noise residual video. The second step performs a
spectral analysis of the noise patterns of the noise residual
video using 2D discrete Fourier transform on each frame.
The new video of spectra is referred to as Fourier spectrum
video. In the third step, to capture temporal information
contained in the Fourier spectrum video, the team uses the
visual rhythm technique [10]. It summarizes the content of
the video in a 2D image by sampling particular regions of
interests. The algorithm considers three regions of interest
and creates three types of visual rhythms: horizontal, ver-
tical and zig-zag. Finally, the visual rhythms are concate-
nated in order to form a single visual rhythm.
From the image representing the visual rhythm, the team
extracts a set of features using its Gray Level Co-occurrence
Matrices (GLCM) [11]. In the classification stage, the team
uses Support Vector Machine (SVM) considering radial ba-
sis function as kernel.
4. Discussion and results
The algorithms proposed in this competition approach
the problem from different aspects, as listed in Table 2.
The analysis of the textural differences is the most popu-
lar approach adopted by 7 out of 8 teams. Three teams use
motion-based approach, but in combination with texture-
based, while one team relies solely on liveness detection.
A common approach for many teams is combining sev-
eral different concepts together. In particular, the fusion is
performed either at score-level or decision-level. An inter-
esting observation is that the category of used features does
not influence the choice of level of fusion. For example,
two teams (CASIA and LNMIIT ) perform feature-level fu-
sion on different categories of features (texture and motion-
based), while MUVIS and IGD adopt the same level of fu-
sion for features belonging to the same category (texture-
based and liveness-based, respectively). On the other hand,
MaskDown combines different categories of techniques at
score-level. PRA Lab utilizes a specific type of fusion
scheme to combine techniques belonging to the same cat-
egory. The fusion approaches of the teams are listed in the
right-most column of Table 2.
The ranking of the participating anti-spoofing algorithms
is based on Half Total Error Rate (HTER). It is defined as
Table 2. Usage of categories of counter-measures and fusion tech-
niques. F stands for feature-level, S for score-level fusion.
Team Texture-
based
Motion-
based
Liveness-
based
Fusion
CASIA X X · F
IGD · · X S
MaskDown X X · S
LNMIIT X X · F
MUVIS X · · F
PRA Lab X · · S
ATVS X · · ·
Unicamp X · · ·
Table 3. Performance results for the proposed anti-spoofing algo-
rithms (in %)
Development Test
Team FAR FRR HTER FAR FRR HTER
CASIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IGD 5.00 8.33 6.67 17.00 1.25 9.13
MaskDown 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 5.00 2.50
LNMIIT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MUVIS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 1.25
PRA Lab 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 1.25
ATVS 1.67 0.00 0.83 2.75 21.25 12.00
Unicamp 13.00 6.67 9.83 12.50 18.75 15.62
a mean of False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejec-
tion Rate (FRR). In the case of anti-spoofing, FAR refers
to the ratio of spoofing attacks which are not correctly de-
tected, while FRR refers to the ratio of real accesses which
are incorrectly classified as spoofing attacks. The HTER is
measured on the anonymized test set using a threshold cal-
culated ’a priori’ on the development set. The threshold,
chosen using the Equal Error Rate (EER) criterion, is the
value equalizing FAR and FRR.
Table 3 summarizes the performance of the proposed al-
gorithms. The performance figures are given for both de-
velopment and anonymized test set. The algorithms are
trained and evaluated considering all the types of attacks
in the Replay-Attack database.
Considering the results on the test set, two teams have
achieved perfect discrimination between the real accesses
and the spoofing attacks of the Replay-Attack database:
CASIA and LNMIIT . Several other teams have achieved
perfect separability of the two classes on the development
set, but their algorithms do not generalize as well on the
anonymized test set. Still, they are outperforming state-of-
the-art algorithms evaluated on Replay-Attack [5], [6].
It is interesting to notice that the winning algorithms fuse
two categories of features: texture- and motion-based. The
rest of the algorithms which achieve very low HTER also
combine several approaches together: PRA Lab and MU-
VIS fuse only texture based methods, while MaskDown
combines different categories of methods, but at score-level.
On the contrary, the algorithms which rely only on a single
cue are less successful in discriminating real accesses and
spoofing attacks.
Considering the diversity of attacks in Replay-Attack, it
seems that an approach relying on a single cue is not able
to detect all types of attacks. Different types and different
qualities of spoofing attacks need to be tackled in a differ-
ent way. Perhaps that is the reason why algorithms that are
combining complementary counter-measures achieve better
results and even manage to solve the spoofing problem for
the Replay-Attack database.
One of the goals of the competition was to support repro-
ducible research by encouraging the participants to provide
the source code of their algorithms as a free software. This
will allow easy reproduction of results and a reliable refer-
ence for comparison with future anti-spoofing algorithms.
One team, MaskDown , responded to this invitation.
5. Conclusion
As a challenging problem critical for the security of the
biometric recognition system, spoofing attacks are drawing
more and more attention from the biometric community.
The face modality is a widely used biometric trait, but ex-
ceptionally easy to spoof due to the wide availability and
easy accessibility to the face data of the users. Starting with
naive spoofing attacks created by printing a face image on a
paper, the face anti-spoofing field achieved great progress
in the past several years. Not only the anti-spoofing al-
gorithms have become complex and sophisticated, but the
spoofing attacks themselves have evolved to be more realis-
tic and very successful in bypassing a baseline face recog-
nition system.
The appearance of Replay-Attack has inspired a com-
petition to challenge researchers to develop novel spoofing
counter-measures able to detect several different types of
face spoofing attacks. This paper presents the face anti-
spoofing algorithms developed in the course of the com-
petition. All 8 participating teams have developed highly-
sophisticated methods, approaching the problem from dif-
ferent aspects. Some of them extend the boundaries of the
established categories of face spoofing counter-measures.
For example, IGD explores a new evidence of liveness: the
human pulse. ATVS introduces a novel cue, which is the
degradation of the quality of images when being recaptured.
Unicamp and MaskDown extend the definition of texture in
temporal dimension.
Several participating teams achieve impressive results in
detecting spoofing attacks in the Replay-Attack database. A
new developing trend that most of them follow is fusion of
different categories of cues. Such an approach seems to be
effective in tackling diverse set of spoofing attacks. As the
quality and sophistication of spoofing attacks is expected to
increase in the future, this observation gives indication on
the directions for future research in face anti-spoofing.
Although refined and effective in deceiving face recogni-
tion systems, the attacks in the Replay-Attack database have
been defeated by the anti-spoofing algorithms proposed in
this competition. One of the main objectives for future work
should be assembling a database with even more realistic
spoofing attacks, for example 3D masks. That database
should inherit the advantages of Replay-Attack, like the un-
biased protocol and the provision of enrollment data.
Given the novel ideas, the achieved results and the drawn
conclusions, the 2nd Competition on Counter Measures to
2D Face Spoofing Attacks has achieved the goals to consoli-
date a set of state-of-the-art face spoofing counter-measures
and to establish a new level of quality for the research in
face anti-spoofing in general.
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